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An operational Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) concept is the real-time 
process of assessing risk posed by close approaches and reacting to those risks if necessary.  
The most effective way to completely mitigate conjunction risk is to perform an avoidance 
maneuver.  The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center has implemented a routine CARA 
process since 2005.  Over this period, considerable experience has been gained and many 
lessons have been learned.  This paper identifies and presents these experiences as general 
concepts in the description of the Conjunction Assessment, Flight Dynamics, and Flight 
Operations methodologies and processes.  These general concepts will be tied together and 
will be exemplified through a case study of an actual high risk conjunction event for the 
Aura mission. 
I. Introduction 
COMPLETE Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) operations concept requires a seamless 
interaction between all concerned parties in reacting to potential close approach events.  Moreover, routine 
CARA is the process of quantifying conjunction risk, planning risk mitigation actions (typically in the form of 
collision avoidance maneuvers), and execution of those actions.  These activities are the respective responsibilities 
of the NASA Robotic CARA Team, Earth Science Mission Operations (ESMO) Flight Dynamics System (FDS) 
Team, and ESMO Fight Operations Teams (FOT). 
A
There are many metrics utilized by the CARA Team to quantify the risk posed by a close approach event, such 
as miss distance and probability of collision.  Assessing the quality of the orbit determination (OD) solutions used to 
perform the close approach predictions is as important as the close approach results themselves; for understanding 
the OD solution quality permits a qualitative assessment of those risk assessment metrics.  As part of a larger 
operations concept, these risk assessments are only useful if they provide sufficient data to mission stakeholders 
who, based on their risk tolerance, mission constraints, and knowledge of overall mission performance, can make 
mitigation decisions based on the risk assessments.  Once the collision risk is determined by the CARA Team to 
warrant risk mitigating action, the FDS team is responsible for planning a risk mitigation, or collision avoidance, 
maneuver.  In this planning process, the FDS team must consider the current orbital position of the spacecraft in 
relation to ground-track control, science requirements, and other orbit constraints.  The team also has to consider 
past maneuver performance and potentially extrapolate performance characteristics into regimes for which there is 
no past experience.  Once the maneuver planning is completed, the FOT is responsible for executing the planned 
maneuver.  In this process, the FOT must consider the current spacecraft state and health.  They must establish that 
proper support has been scheduled to ensure safe execution of the maneuver.  This support includes scheduling 
proper communication and coverage for tracking, telemetry, and command, as well as ground staffing.  The FOT 
must also inform each Instrument Operation Team (IOT) to ensure the instruments are properly configured.  In 
addition, the FOT must generate, validate, and deliver the spacecraft command loads to execute the maneuver and 
monitor health and performance throughout the maneuver. 
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 This entire process occurs over the timeframe of a few days to a week.  This short timeline offers its own 
challenges, especially in the form of communication and interaction among the teams.  Moreover, the process is not 
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as linear as suggested, but more of a complex, dynamically evolving, fluid interaction between the necessary parties.  
This paper identifies and addresses these considerations.  These experiences will be presented as general concepts in 
the description of the CARA, Flight Dynamics, and Flight Operations methodologies and processes in Section II.  
The team interaction will also be developed and shown through a case study of an actual high risk conjunction event 
for the Earth Observing System (EOS) Aura mission in Section III.  Finally, lessons learned resulting from this case 
study will be presented, and the impact to future CA operations will be described in Section IV.   
II. Nominal Aura Mission & Process Overview  
A.  Mission Overview 
DTM 1
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DTM 4
YSBF
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The EOS Aura mission flies in a larger formation of 
satellites called the Earth Science Constellations, 
specifically the Afternoon Constellation.  Currently 
comprised of 5 Earth-observing satellites that all 
nominally operate in 705-km mean equatorial height, 
sun-synchronous polar orbits., the Constellation allows 
for collaborative science but also imposes constraints 
on relative location, both for science requirements and 
mission and constellation safety.  The design of the 
spacecraft itself also imposes some restrictions on 
maneuver performance both due to the inability to 
perform orbit-lowering maneuvers and due to the lack 
of dedicated attitude control thrusters.  Aura must rely 
on four thrusters that provide both orbit change delta-v 
and attitude control during propulsive maneuvers by 
off-pulsing each thruster after a specific amount of 
attitude error is accumulated.  This dead band attitude control thrusting prior to and after the delta-v maneuver is 
somewhat variable on this spacecraft, depending upon the spacecraft initial conditions while entering Attitude Hold 
Mode (AHM) .  This leads to the potential for relatively large delta-v performance errors for the short duration 
maneuvers, which are typically required to provide conjunction risk mitigation, since attitude control effectively 
results in additional thrust in the delta-v direction.  Modeling of this additional delta-v is based on historical 
spacecraft performance.   Each pair of primary and redundant thruster sets, or dual thruster modules (DTM), as 
shown in , are canted such that the resulting thrust vector extends through the spacecraft center of mass. 
Figure 1: Aura Spacecraft Schematic 
Figure 1
 It should be noted that Aura’s orbit is maintained within a targeted ground track control box of +/- 10 kilometers 
centered at +18 kilometers east of Aqua’s current Worldwide Reference System-2 (WRS-2) path.  This allows Aura 
to perform the most desirable co-located science with other Afternoon Constellation members.  However, the 
official science requirement is +/- 20 kilometers of allowable ground track error. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the other mission constraints that must be maintained during the conjunction mitigation process.  These 
requirements are provide for reference, and their impacts will be discussed later in this paper. 
Table 1: Aura Orbit Requirements 
Constraint Requirement Reason 
Ground Track Control +/- 20 km WRS-2 (target +/- 10 km) Mission & Constellation Safety, Science 
Eccentricity 0.0012 +/- 0.0004 Mission & Constellation Safety, Science 
Argument of Perigee 90 +/- 20 degrees Mission & Constellation Safety, Science 
Mean Local Time 13:30 to 14:00 Science 
 
B.  Conjunction & Maneuver Assessment Process 
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The CARA Team at the NASA/GSFC provides CARA services to NASA’s robotic assets, both maneuverable 
and non-maneuverable.  Since 2005, NASA/GSFC has been receiving close approach prediction information from 
the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), located at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB).  The JSpOC “screens” 
ephemerides of the asset spacecraft against the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) high accuracy 
Resident Space Object (RSO) catalog.  USSTRATCOM maintains high accuracy element sets for over 19,000 
objects in space, including payloads, rocket bodies, and other space debris.  The JSpOC screens both its own 
ephemeris for each asset as well as any Owner/Operator (O/O)-produced ephemeris, when provided, against the 
catalog.  The advantage of screening an O/O product is that planned orbit-adjust maneuvers are typically included, 
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whereas the JSpOC ephemeris is propagated without knowledge of those future maneuvers.  For any identified 
conjunctions or close approaches between two orbiting space objects, the JSpOC delivers those close approach 
predictions to GSFC.  Using this data, the GSFC CARA Team quantifies the risk associated with the identified 
conjunctions and provides reports to all mission stakeholders.  The CARA Team works closely with mission 
management, flight dynamics, and flight operations teams to assess the risk and determine what, if any, mitigating 
actions can be performed to reduce that risk while still achieving the mission constraints. 
Pre-processed close approach data is nominally delivered to the CARA Team daily.  The initial real-time 
analysis to calculate Probability of Collision (Pc) and produce trending data is automated and performed as data are 
received.  A CA Summary Report is automatically generated and delivered to all identified and approved mission 
stakeholders.  This report contains information regarding all conjunctions identified with any asset spacecraft.  
Moreover, it identifies the asset (or primary) spacecraft; secondary object; Time of Closest Approach (TCA); miss 
distance RSS; radial, along-track, and cross-track separation; conjunction probability; as well as trends of each of 
these parameters throughout the prediction span.  Typically for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) missions, these predictions 
are made seven days into the future.   
As part of the routine CA operations, the CARA Team reviews each conjunction and dispositions the risk or 
threat level associated with it.  This process of dispositioning and determining conjunction risk requires significant 
CA and mission operations experience. Conjunction risk assessment is the analysis and process of translating the 
close approach predictions (object states, covariances, and associated orbit determination data) into actionable 
information for mission stakeholders.  Conjunction risk assessment includes assessing the quality of the OD data 
being used and quantifying and analyzing the risk associated with a predicted conjunction, evaluating risk mitigation 
options, and determining what actions are necessary.  In other words, the CA process is quantifying the risk of the 
predicted close approach and determining how much confidence should be placed in the quantified risk. 
The conjunction geometry, specifically miss distance, is a simple metric that can be easily related to conjunction 
risk – the smaller the miss distance, the closer the two objects will approach other.  The Probability of Collision (Pc) 
is also a straightforward metric for measuring conjunction risk – the higher the Pc, the more likely that a predicted 
conjunction will result in a collision.  However, these metrics alone do not determine the true conjunction risk. 
There are many aspects of a conjunction that are analyzed in determining the associated risk, which fall into four 
general Figures of Merit (FOMs) that factor into the analyst’s disposition.  These FOMs are conjunction geometry, 
probability and uncertainty, conjunction evolution or trends, and orbit determination (OD) quality.  The first three 
categories relate to the risk of the close approach.  The fourth category, OD quality assessment, evaluates the OD 
solutions that are used in the close approach prediction process and ultimately determines the validity of the first 
three FOMs.  It also provides the analyst with a measure of the confidence in the covariance generated in the OD 
process in accurately capturing and reflecting the actual orbit errors of the objects.  Without this qualitative 
assessment, rigorous conjunction assessment could not be performed. 
These FOMs and their relation to conjunction risk assessment will become more apparent in the case study 
presented in Section III.  A specific conjunction involving the Aura spacecraft, the integrated approach to analysis of 
the conjunction, and the subsequent risk mitigation maneuver process will be examined.     
 
C.  Maneuver Planning Process 
The Aura Flight Dynamics team is responsible for maintaining the spacecraft within its designated orbit to assure 
science objectives are satisfied.  This includes planning maneuvers, providing spacecraft attitude support, 
performing lifetime analyses, and generating products used for spacecraft and instrument operations.  During 
collision avoidance maneuvers, FDS activities begin when the mission management determines that a collision 
avoidance maneuver may be required based upon the results of the CARA Team analysis.  As with a typical orbit 
maintenance maneuver, these preliminary activities involve determining the time and duration of the maneuver and 
communicating this information to the FOT to schedule the appropriate ground or space network contacts.  Initially, 
an estimated impulsive delta-v necessary to mitigate the conjunction risk to sufficient level is received from the 
CARA Team, which will be discussed in the case study. 
The Aura spacecraft has the capability to perform two types of propulsive maneuvers: drag make-up (DMU) 
maneuvers to control its WRS-2 ground track and inclination maneuvers to control its mean local time (MLT) drift.  
Aura DMU durations are very constrained due to the mission ground track control requirements.  To mitigate a 
conjunction, the Aura FDS team approach is to plan a maneuver similar to a DMU, but typically with a shorter 
maneuver duration.  The maneuver is usually performed 24-48 hours prior to the predicted TCA.  A short-duration 
burn performed sufficiently prior to TCA will allow the along-track separation component to increase, mitigating the 
conjunction risk without significantly changing the radial component.  For DMU maneuvers, which are intended to 
increase only the semi-major axis of the orbit, the typical maneuver duration is approximately 6 to 20 seconds 
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depending upon the predicted solar activity and atmospheric density.  Collision avoidance maneuvers, however, are 
planned with consideration for the lowest possible maneuver duration required to mitigate the conjunction risk and 
maintain orbit requirements, while still achieving the equivalent impulsive pro-grade delta-v (Aura does not have the 
capability to perform retro-grade maneuvers) recommended by the CARA Team. 
 Selecting an appropriate duration is often the most challenging aspect of collision avoidance maneuvers for the 
FDS.  Since Aura operates in the Afternoon Constellation, maximum maneuver sizes must be evaluated with 
mission and Constellation safety considerations.  Performing a 2-second collision avoidance maneuver may not only 
violate the goal of maintaining a target WRS-2 error of +/- 10 kilometers, but may threaten to move the spacecraft 
into the control box of another Afternoon Constellation mission if it moves outside of its required +/-20 kilometer 
ground track error, which is the hard constraint.  To avoid this undesirable scenario of close approaches between the 
Afternoon Constellation members, Aura rarely purposefully flies within the bottom (0 to -10 kilometer) half of its 
control box.  This strategy allows the spacecraft to maintain its typical DMU cycling within 0 to +10 kilometers 
while keeping 0 to -10 kilometers reserved for collision avoidance maneuvers.  Once a collision avoidance 
maneuver is performed, Aura will have maintained its -10 kilometer WRS-2 science target and will not compromise 
the safety of the Afternoon Constellation.  The minimum burn required is always used to allow capacity for a 
possible collision avoidance maneuver required before drag has returned Aura to the desired segment of the control 
box.  O/O ephemeris files are produced by FDS for each maneuver duration under consideration and are sent to the 
JSpOC for screening. The results of those screenings are used to select the best/safest burn duration.  
After deciding upon a burn duration that will both mitigate the conjunction and maintain Aura’s orbit 
requirements, maneuver products must be generated and delivered to the FOT.  These products are specifically 
formatted flat ASCII files that contain information pertinent to the maneuver, such as the burn duration, maneuver 
time, and the commanded attitude.  After rigorous quality assurance checks by the FDS team, the files are delivered 
and again quality assurance checked by FOT personnel, who will use these products to build the command 
sequences which will be uploaded to the spacecraft.  If any part of the maneuver plan needs to be adjusted, either 
due to updated conjunction information or a change in the maneuver contact, the planning is revisited, resulting in 
an update to this product set.  In addition to the maneuver products, a standard daily set of products are also 
produced which model the maneuver.  These products include specific orbit events, such as day/night transitions and 
maximum/minimum latitude crossings, which are used by the FOT and instrument teams for planning purposes as 
well as serve as a notification to other Afternoon Constellation members that a maneuver is currently planned. 
Immediately after completion of the maneuver, its performance is assessed by the FDS team via reconstruction 
and calibration activities.  Reconstruction of the maneuver involves using actual on-times to determine each 
thruster’s duty cycle and, assuming the correct thrust scale factor was planned, allows Flight Dynamics to determine 
the first-order maneuver performance.  After an adequate number of Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) 
contacts have occurred allowing an accurate orbit determination to be performed, FDS makes use of a definitive 
post-maneuver ephemeris to determine the thrust scale factor of the maneuver.  This knowledge, coupled with the 
duty cycles obtained from the reconstruction, allows for a complete assessment of the maneuver’s performance.  If 
the change in the spacecraft’s semi-major axis was close to the planned change, it is safe to assume that the 
maneuver was successful in mitigating the conjunction.  The post-maneuver orbit is then also used to generate an 
updated set of daily products produced after the reconstruction and calibration are complete, and will also be 
screened by the CARA Team on the following day.  For assurance that the maneuver was completed nominally, an 
email notification is delivered to the flight teams of the other Afternoon Constellation member missions. 
 
D.  Maneuver Execution Process 
The primary role of the FOT during the avoidance maneuver process is to execute the maneuver via onboard and 
real-time commanding, and to monitor the spacecraft performance and health throughout the maneuver to verify that 
each step of the maneuver occurs successfully.  In support of this role, the FOT must work with both the CARA and 
FDS teams to determine the attributes of the maneuver and generate the operational products needed to perform the 
maneuver.  These products include the maneuver loads in the Stored Command Sequences (SCS), the execution 
script (Day Plan), Pass Plan Change Requests (PPCRs), and the maneuver Command Authorization Meeting (CAM) 
package.  As the safety of the spacecraft is paramount, the FOT documents in detail the steps for executing 
important tasks such as planning and executing a maneuver, in the form of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). 
Prior to June 2008, the only established SOP or defined process available to the FOT for planning collision 
avoidance maneuvers was the nominal Drag Make-Up Maneuver process.  This process was established prior to 
launch based on spacecraft manufacturer, Northrup Grumman, delivered “flows.”  This process is built on the 
operational philosophy of separating the three segments of the maneuver (slew out, burn, slew back) and ensuring 
that each segment occurs at the precise, predetermined times via onboard SCSs.  This makes certain that each 
portion of the maneuver can be executed independently, and that the execution is not reliant on ground commanding 
or subject to time variations, in order to provide the maximum safety and predictability.  In order to achieve these 
goals, three SCSs are used (one for each segment) and each SCS contains an absolute time command that triggers 
the sequence.  Using absolute time commands allows for precise timing and predictability, but also greatly limits the 
flexibility to plan and execute the maneuver. 
The process of preparing for and executing an orbit-raising maneuver on Aura contains several steps as shown in 
Figure 2(a).  The steps for a DMU maneuver nominally occur over the course of two weeks to allow time to notify 
all of the IOT and schedule contacts through the normal Space Network (SN) conflict resolution process . 
 
 
Figure 2: (a) Nominal DMU (left) versus (b) Expedited DMU Timeline (right) 
 
The sequence shown in Figure 2(b) is the same sequence; however the timeline has been compressed to the 
minimum possible durations given current constraints.  Due to the fact that the CA screenings only predict 7 days 
into the future, the nominal 2 week preparation schedule could not be followed and had to be modified to the 
schedule on the right.  The limiting factors that require preparation to begin the morning of the day before the 
collision avoidance maneuver are the notification of the maneuver to the IOTs and the building of the SCS (contains 
instrument reconfigurations if needed as well as communication configuration commands).  These times could not 
be shortened further, because this amount of time is required for the IOTs to reconfigure their instruments if needed 
and for the nominal merged command load (MCL) generation process to be executed the prior day. 
The process flow shown is comprised of 10 steps.  The first three steps are executed by Flight Dynamics, 
Guidance Navigation and Control (GNC), and Communications (COMM) engineers.  The FDS engineer provides 
the target burn date and time, along with the burn duration (step 1).  This time is then used by the FOT, GNC, and 
COMM engineers to correlate the desired maneuver time with the available contact times (step 2).  If contact time is 
not available to support the desired maneuver time, the FOT engineers work with FDS engineers to modify the time 
to meet the contact visibility requirements for the maneuver.  Some key constraints for the maneuver are that the 
time between slew out end and burn start should be greater than 10 minutes and that the time between burn end and 
slew back start should be at least 15 minutes.  Once the time has been locked down, the GNC engineer will then 
generate the maneuver plan, which details the timing for each segment of the maneuver, and determine how those 
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times match up with orbital night/day, the quaternion values that will be loaded to the spacecraft and when the GNC 
subsystem onboard will change from Fine-Point Mode to AHM and back (step 3).  This plan is then sent out to the 
IOTs for their planning purposes (step 4).  The IOTs may wish, on the basis of this information, to cancel a planned 
observation or reschedule the timing of an instrument activity via the MCL.  Any rescheduled or additional 
instrument commanding is then verified by the FOT Instrument engineer (step 5).  This portion of the flow (steps 4 
& 5) is extremely time critical, as the whole sequence from the time of IOT notification, to updating/rescheduling 
instrument commanding via the MCL and verification of that MCL must occur within as little as 2 hours.  On the 
Aura mission, all the instrument teams are in different time zones than the FOT, and two of the four are located in 
Europe.  This makes the already tight coordination requirements even more challenging. 
With this coordination step complete and the MCL built and verified, the rest of the process can continue.  This 
section (steps 6-9) consists of the final burn parameters being delivered to the FOT’s operational planning system in 
the form of FDS products (step 6).  These products are then ingested by the planning system, which provides the 
information necessary for the FOT GNC engineer to generate the maneuver SCSs (step 7).  This is done with 
configuration management personnel present to insure that loads are properly delivered to the operational system.  
Once the generation is complete, the GNC engineers generate the SCS reports and verify that every command in 
each of the three SCSs is correct in both content and timing (step 8).  Once the maneuver SCS have been verified, 
the configuration management (CM) personnel deliver the SCS loads to the real-time command and telemetry 
system for uplink (step 9). 
Following the successful completion of all of the preparation steps, both the FOT and FDS teams generate a slide 
presentation to be presented at the Command Authorization Meeting (CAM) that explains the details of the 
maneuver and that all the necessary preparation has been performed (step 10).  At the conclusion of the meeting the 
Mission Director grants approval for the maneuver to proceed.  With the approval in hand, all the FOT has left to do 
is to execute the maneuver. 
III. Assessment, Planning, and Execution Process in Action: An Aura Conjunction Case Study 
In this case study, the coordinated interaction needed to mitigate conjunctions with collision avoidance 
maneuvers between the CARA, FDS, and FOT teams will become readily apparent through analysis of an actual 
high interest event.  This interaction includes communication and exchange of data and information, and shows the 
intensity of this exchange during real-time operations as well as the need for a formalized process.  The process at 
the time of this event will be described in this section.  Lessons learned and process improvements that helped in the 
maturation of the CARA  process as a result of this event will be described in the next section. 
 
Saturday, 21 June (6 Days Prior to TCA) 
On the evening of Saturday, 21 June 2008, a close approach was predicted between Aura and secondary object 
01399, a piece of OPS 4682 debris, during a routine conjunction assessment screening.  The TCA for this event was 
Friday, 27 June 2008, approximately 6 days following identification of the close approach event.  The Saturday 
screening, although not typically a nominal screening day, was performed in lieu of a Friday screening due to 
external considerations.  The initial close approach prediction, based on the ASW (Astrodynamics Support 
Workstation – an acronym for the orbit determination and astrodynamics software used at the JSpOC to produce the 
close approach predictions) was a total miss distance of 29.8 meters with a corresponding Pc of 7.9E-2.  The close 
approach predictions based on the Owner/Operator (O/O) ephemeris was 113 meters.  The difference between the 
two solutions observed in the initial prediction is due to differences in modeling and is not unexpected in magnitude. 
 
Sunday, 22 June (5 Days Prior to TCA) 
On the morning of Sunday, 22 June, a CA Analyst reviewed the screening results from the previous day.  After 
observing the initial signs of a potential high interest event, e.g. low miss distance and high Pc, the analyst internally 
notified the CARA Team of the potential event to be worked on Monday morning.  Since this event did not appear 
in a previous screening, and it first entered the screening volume over a weekend when no other routine support was 
scheduled, there were no communications with the JSpOC or other interested parties until Monday.  Nominally, 
three in-family predictions of an event are desired to show consistency or establish trends in the close approach 
predictions before any action is recommended.   
 
 
 
 
Monday, 23 June (4 Days Prior to TCA) 
On Monday morning, 23 June, the CARA Team began preliminary detailed analysis of the conjunction.  The 
first analysis performed was conjunction and covariance geometry visualization in which the conjunction angle, 
defined as the angle between the velocity vectors of the two conjuncting objects, is determined. 
The location of the conjunction was predicted to 
occur at a latitude of 72.9 degrees South and a 
longitude of 0.4 degrees East.  Few sensors had 
direct observability of the conjunction location.  
Direct observability would help to reduce OD 
errors in the predicted state.  
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The next step was to understand how the 
covariance and conjunction geometry related to 
the high Pc computed.  To aid in this 
understanding, an artificial coordinate system 
can be constructed.  For short-encounter 
conjunctions, the relative position (miss 
distance) vector is perpendicular to the relative 
velocity vector.  Using this simplification, a 
right-handed coordinate system can be 
constructed from the relative position, relative 
velocity, and cross-product of the two vectors.  
The conjunction plane is defined by the two-
dimensional plane between the relative position 
and cross-product vectors (i.e. looking down the relative velocity vector).  The miss distance is known and can be 
plotted easily.  It is the Hard-Body Radius (HBR), which is an estimate of the combined physical sizes of the objects 
involved, as a circle of radius HBR at the miss distance direction.  By definition, this falls on the x-axis on the 
conjunction plane plot, off-set from the y-axis by the miss distance.  The last step roject the combined 
covariance of the two objects onto the conjunction plane.  With this plot, as shown in Figure 3, the size, shape, and 
orientation of the uncertainty can be visualized and measured as it relates to the miss distance and conjunction 
Figure 3: Conjunction Plane Plot 
 is to p
and the 
geometry. 
 From Figure 3, the clock angle is defined as the angle between the principle axis of the combined error ellipse 
miss distance direction, or the x-axis.  
For this conjunction, the clock angle was 14.7 
degrees.  Also from Figure 3 it is observed that 
the conjunction and covariance geometry is 
such that a significant component of the 
combined position uncertainty is in the miss 
distance direction. The reported Pc is also 
computed from this conjunction plane.  For 
short-encounter close approaches, the two-
dimensional Pc can be calculated by integrating 
this com
distribution f
bined covariance probability 
unction (pdf) over the HBR, as 
shown in Equation 1 [Ref 1]:    
Figure 4: Pc Sensitivity Plot 
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 The final step in the preliminary analysis is to explore the sensitivity of the computed Pc to various input 
parameters.  Figure 4 shows a Pc sensitivity surface plot versus a combined uncertainty scale factor and the HBR 
used in the Pc calculation.  For Pc sensitivity, the scale factor is a scale from 0 to 1, applied to the covariance matrix 
of both the primary and secondary object. The immediate feature that the CARA team observed was the Pc 
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 team selected a 2.0 second burn duration, which was estimated to provide a delta-v of 
0.0091 meters per second.  Although planning for a larger burn duration would provide greater assurance that the 
sitivity to the covariance scale factor.  Figure 4 shows that even if the combined covariance, or combined 
position uncertainty, of the two objects decrease due to increased tracking, the Pc will increase.  This initial Pc 
sensitivity was another indication that this conjunction was of high risk to Aura. 
After the preliminary analysis on Monday, which confirmed Sunday’s suspicion that this conjunction was of high 
interest, the CARA Team notified the Aura Mission Director and requested an additional screening update from the 
JSpOC.  It was decided to have an introductory meeting with all the mission stakeholders, including the FDS 
T, to discuss the conjunction and initial planning.  At this point, the CARA Team only had two updates on the 
conjunction.  However, since the CARA Team h
typically leads to avoidance maneuvers, the missi
The CARA Team also presented a maneuve
options that exist between r size and 
phase time (time between maneuver execution 
and conjunction TCA).  The initial ma
ade space plot is shown in Figure 5, where the 
contours are lines of constant post-maneuver 
miss distance (shown in kilometers on Figure 
5).  The trade space is constructed under the 
assumption that only velocity or anti-velocity 
direction maneuvers are performed and that the 
conjunction is mitigated by allow
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neuver 
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ore, al
 zero me
sis, incl
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sing to increase the along-track separation 
between the two objects.  Details of this 
approach can be found in Reference 2. 
For the Aura spacecraft, only posigrade 
maneuvers are possible.  Theref l of the 
trade space to the left of the ters per 
second delta-v burn is not possible, as indicated 
by the shaded red region in Figure 5.  From 
previous analy uding the conjunction plane plot in Figure 3, the CARA Team determined that a post-
maneuver miss distance of at least 300 to 500 meters would be needed to mitigate the conjunction to a sufficient 
level to drive the Pc towards zero.  The required
green line in Figure 5.  Therefore everything ab
acceptable maneuver trade space options.  Du
performed during nominal day shifts.  In 
addition, due to the desire to trend the 
conjun
Figure 5: Maneuver Trade Space Plot for Initial Planning 
a, typical maneuver execution times are 
chosen to be about 24 to 48 hours prior to event 
TCA. 
However,  this maneuver 
introduced a unique challenge in that Aura was 
required to perform the delta-v as noted by the 
dashed line in Figure 5, which is small in 
comparison to the typical DMU delta-v.  While 
imparting such a small delta-v on the orbit may 
cause a negligible effect on the argument of 
perigee and eccentricity requirements listed in
Table 1, it can have a drastic effect on the 
WRS-2 requirement depending on Aura’s 
position and rate within its control box.  In 
order to maintain Aura’s science 
requirements, the smallest burn duration was used to avoid drifting below the -10 kilometer WRS-2 target.  
Considering these constraints and historic maneuver performance (Aura’s previous shortest maneuver duration was 
8.75 seconds), S
Figure 6: WRS-2 Ground Track Error for Maneuver Options
 the FD
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con
t such a short burn duration was feasible 
wi
ese close 
approach update trends were presented to mission stakeholders at the discussion.  Additionally, preliminary planning 
our maneuver had been completed by the FOT and FDS teams. 
 
junction would be mitigated, these larger maneuvers did violate the +/-10 kilometer WRS-2 target for Aura, as 
illustrated by Figure 6. 
The burn duration was then used to determine the ideal time of a one-burn maneuver sequence that would 
maintain the spacecraft within the frozen orbit requirements of the mission.  Since it was unknown when the 
maneuver would occur relative to the TCA, ideal maneuver times occurring at approximately TCA minus 24 and 48 
hours were provided to the FOT to be used as a guideline for scheduling maneuver contacts.  Meanwhile, due to the 
FOT’s nominal practice of informing the IOTs and generating the stored command load two days prior to the 
maneuver, the FOT added additional contacts for Wednesday and developed their maneuver plan should a TCA 
minus 48 hours DAM be required.  As part of this planning process, several discussions were held between the FDS 
and FOT teams regarding how to properly predict such a short maneuver, since this duration was well outside of the 
nominal DMU regime.  Also, the onboard SCSs were reviewed to ensure tha
th the existing onboard software code.  In order to have absolute confidence there would be no issue, a simulation 
of a 2-second burn was performed on the spacecraft high-fidelity simulator. 
Simultaneously with these activities, the CARA Team coordinated with the JSpOC to receive additional updates 
as well as screen the predicted maneuver ephemeris for any induced conjunctions.  The next tag-up occurred in the 
morning on Tuesday, 24 June.  At this point, the CARA Team had received four updates to this event.  Th
for a Wednesday, 25 June TCA minus 48 h
0246
0
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100
150
200
Tuesday, 24 June (3 Days Prior to TCA) 
All mission stakeholders reconvened again 
Tuesday, 24 June, in the afternoon.  At this 
point, the CARA Team had received five 
updates.  It was decided by the Mission 
Director that maneuvering at the TCA minus 48 
hour timeframe should be removed from 
discussion as planning for a TCA-24 hour 
maneuver allowed for an additional day of 
conjunction trending before a maneuver 
decision was needed.  This required re-planning 
of the maneuver, by both the FDS and FOT 
teams, for the TCA minus 24 hour ideal 
maneuver time, though it was decided by the 
duration since this would still provide a lar
enough delta-v to allow for an acceptable 
along-track sep f
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FDS team to maintain the same 2.0 second burn 
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rom the object, 
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Figure 7: Maneuver Trade Space as of Tuesday PM, 24 June
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Radial
il strated in the revisited maneuver trade 
space shown in Figure 7. 
 Since retrograde maneuvers are not an 
option for Aura, that portion of the trade 
space was removed.  The two horizontal 
black lines provide references for both the 
TCA minus 24 and TCA minus 48 hour 
maneuver scenarios.  The red dashed line 
indicates the minimum burn size that Aura 
could perform without violating its WRS-2 
ground track control box.  The removal of 
the TCA minus 48 hour scenario required 
the FOT to again add additional contacts, 
rebuild their maneuver plan, and inform the 
IOTs that a collision avoidance maneuver 
on Wednesday was no longer being 
considered and that a Thursday burn had 
been selected.  Another key note to this re-
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Figure 8: Final (a)Miss Distance,  (b) R-I-C, and (c) Pc Trends 
planning process is the necessity for the FDS and FOT teams to have quick turnaround and proper communication 
about the delivery of products for the burn and no burn cases.  Should the wrong version of the products get 
delivered or ingested by the mission planning system, the wrong information would be used to build the stored 
oad and ephemerides, which could ultimately lead to executing a undesired maneuver without fully 
 
command l
knowing implications on the conjunction. 
 
Wednesday, 25 June (2 Days Prior to  TCA) 
On Wednesday, 25 June, the teams met one final time for the CAM.  The final decision at the CAM is a go/no-go 
decision on the collision avoidance maneuver.  At this point, the CARA Team had six updates, which were 
presented to mission stakeholders. The FDS team had modeled the nominal maneuver in an ephemeris, and no 
additional post-maneuver conjunctions were identified when it had been screened by the JSpOC.  In addition to the 
nominal maneuver, the FDS team generated hot and cold maneuver performance cases which were both modeled in 
ephemerides and screened.  Although there were no induced conjunctions by either of the off-nominal maneuver 
performance cases, the accuracy of these predictions was discussed.  At approximately 1 minute before and after the 
maneuver duration, Aura enters a thruster based attitude hold mode where the spacecraft may require pulses from 
any of its thrusters (due to initial spacecraft conditions at AHM transition and perturbations during AHM) to 
maintain its attitude within attitude control system constraints.  Considering a burn duration of 2.0 seconds versus 
the standard DMU maneuver duration of 6 to 20 seconds, the maneuver performance becomes increasingly sensitive 
to these few, somewhat unpredictable thruster pulses.  With so much uncertainty in the predicted maneuver 
performance, the FDS team bounded the problem by using the extreme hot and cold cases to determine the possible 
performance envelope.  The CARA, FDS, and FOT teams all confirmed ready status to support the maneuver and 
unanimously recommended executing the nominal planned collision avoidance maneuver on Thursday, 26 June, 
approximately 24 hours prior to event TCA.  Figures 8 a, b, c show the final miss distance; radial, along-track, and 
cross-track separation; and Pc trends, respectively.  From these figures, it is obvious that the initial forecasts from
nt remained of high interest throughout the evolution of the conjunction.  
 
 
the CARA Team were correct and the eve
Thursday, 25 June (1 Day Prior to TCA) 
The 2.0 second maneuver was executed 
successfully by the flight operations team at 
14:25:00 GMT. The final predicted post-
maneuver miss distance based on the 
nominal maneuver plan was 652 meters. 
From post-maneuver reconstruction and 
calibration, the maneuver performed a delta-
v of 0.0122 meters per second resulting in a 
semi-major axis increase of 23.06 meters 
versus the nominal plan of 17.36 meters, or 
32.9 percent over performance.  Although 
this delta-v was substantially larger than the 
planned maneu still fell within the 
advertised predicted performance envelope 
as indicated in Figure 9.  Post-event analysis 
showed the final close approach miss 
distance was 795 meters, with a Pc of zero. 
Assessment, planning, and execution of the
collision avoidance maneuver succe
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08
WR
S-2
 Gr
ou
nd
 Tr
ack
 Er
ror
 (k
m)
nominal
hot
cold
actual
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
10
Date
 
 
ssfully 
mitigated a potential collision between Aura 
r planning, the CARA, FDS, 
nd FOT Teams learned many valuable lessons and were able to significantly improve their operations even more.  
his section provides a summary of these lessons learned and process improvements.  
ver, it 
 
Figure 9: Predicted maneuver performance and actual results 
with WRS-2 targets and requirements 
and a piece of orbiting space debris. 
IV. Maneuver Assessment, Planning, and Execution Lessons Learned & Process Improvements 
As previously indicated, the process in place at the time of this Aura conjunction was already very mature.  
However, as a result of this conjunction and subsequent collision avoidance maneuve
a
T
 
 
 
gma level is a comparison of the observed 
change in relative miss distance compone  between updates to the previous update’s expectation, or, the ability of 
the covariance to capture expected cha as shown in Equation 2.  
A.  Conjunction Assessment 
The miss distance and Pc are two indicators of conjunction risk.  However, it is also important to ensure that the 
input data being used to produce those predictions is of high quality.  Simply stated, an effort must be made to 
ensure that the covariance provided from the OD estimation method accurately reflects the actual orbital errors of 
the objects.  Since the Aura conjunction, one check to ensure that the covariance is bounding the changes in 
conjunction observed geometry is the miss sigma level plot.  The miss si
nts
nges, 
m
ii mmevelMissSigmaL σ
−= +1   (2) 
The miss sigma level can be trended 
over the evolution of a conjunction.  This 
trend provides a check to ensure the state 
changes observed in each update is 
bounded by the statistical expectations 
from the covariance of the previous update.  
This addition n es quantitative 
assurance which was p
0
3
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reviously performed 
ever violates the 3-
gma bound; this is representative of a covariance in which the CARA Team would have high confidence.  The 
vel is to zero, the better the covariance captures the actual uncertainties. 
re
utside of the typical planned DMU durations, and give the mission 
perators a valuable data point which they can use to plan a short duration maneuver for risk mitigation while 
aintaining their ground track requirements. 
qualitatively.  Figure 10 provides an 
example of this trend. 
If there is sufficient tracking on the 
object, then the covariance that results 
from the OD process should accurately 
reflect the dynamic errors.  Therefore, you 
would expe a level to stay 
well bounded within 3 sigma range.  In the 
example in Figure 10, the miss sigma level violates the 1-sigma bounds on a few updates and n
Figure 10: Miss Sigma Level Trend Example 
si
tighter the miss sigma le
 
B.  Flight Dynamics 
 Aura’s first collision avoidance maneuver did successfully mitigate the close approach with the conjuncting 
object, but the performance of the maneuver relative to the nominal FDS prediction was unsatisfactory.  Shortly 
after this event, an analysis was undertaken to improve the accuracy of future maneuver predictions, specifically 
maneuvers of a small duration.  It was determined that the number of pre- and post-maneuver attitude thruster firings 
was underestimated in the hot performance case which resulted in a larger change to the semi-major axis than had 
been planned.  In order to rectify the discrepancy, each of Aura’s previous maneuvers were analyzed to determine 
the extent of pre- and post-maneuver attitude thrusting activity and establish a trend to predict the activity of an 
upcoming maneuver.  This would be done by analyzing each of the previous maneuvers in three segments: the pre-
maneuver attitude segment, the actual delta-v, and the post-maneuver attitude segment.  This allows for the discrete 
calculation of duty cycles for each thruster over each segment which can be used to model the thruster activity of a 
maneuver with a specific duration and known pre- and post-maneuver attitude hold mode durations.  This is in 
contrast to the prior method, where a duty cycle was determined for each thruster based upon the total thrusting that 
occurred as a function of only the delta-v duration. Several maneuvers were re-planned using the attitude hold mode 
data from prior maneuvers to determine revised duty cycles, and the results were large improvements in the 
p dicted accuracy of short duration maneuvers.  This new method is now currently used to determine the thruster 
duty cycles of both the Aqua and Aura spacecrafts for short DMU and collision avoidance maneuvers.   
 For new missions which are held to relatively small ground track requirements, it may be beneficial to plan a few 
short duration, or small delta-v, maneuvers as part of nominal DMU operations to assess their performance.  This 
would help quantify thruster performance o
o
m
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track separation 
tra
f a maneuver is needed with a very short 
tu
 these segments removed, only one SCS would 
b
 the instrument 
 of a collision with a piece 
of debris, having a process or sets of processes in place in order to be ready to respond to any scenario, provides the 
best posture for ensuring the continued safety a s of the spacecraft. 
ember of 
the Aura FDS team, for his efforts in improving the predicted accuracy of maneuver planning.  Lastly, the authors 
would like to thank William (Bill) Guit, Aura Missi r his encouragement of this effort. 
 
 
C. Flight Operations 
Performing the June 2008 close approach allowed the FOT to realize several areas in the current DMU-style 
maneuver process that were not ideally suited for dealing with a dynamically changing maneuver planning 
environment like the one leading up to the execution of the June collision avoidance maneuver.  This caused the 
FOT to revisit the current process and identify what changes/enhancements could be made to allow for greater 
flexibility in planning/executing a collision avoidance maneuver.   The three main focuses of these improvements 
were to eliminate the use of absolute time commands in the maneuver SCSs, allow for a variable burn duration, and 
determine if the instruments could be configured in real-time versus through the MCL.  By eliminating the absolute 
time commands, the maneuver execution would be based off of ground commanding.  This was avoided in the 
original DMU design due to the fact that it would lead to slight variations in the timing of the maneuver and make 
the maneuver execution dependent on the communication link.  However, when executing a maneuver, the burn 
durations are typically very small; therefore minor changes (a few seconds) to the start time of the maneuver are 
insignificant, since the effect on the orbit of the spacecraft is minimal and the evolution of the along-
nspires over many hours.  With this dependence removed, the FOT is immediately more flexible in terms of 
response time from when a decision to execute a maneuver is made until when it will be executed.   
The second enhancement considered was to remove the fixed burn duration from the maneuver SCSs.  This 
would allow more time for the CARA Team to analyze the conjunction i
rnaround.  This would allow the FOT to set the burn duration from the ground, independent of the onboard SCSs.  
Again, allowing for greater flexibility to respond to any DAM scenario. 
 Also examined was to determine if the yaw slew out and slew back portions (~+/- 14 degrees for Aura) of the 
maneuver could be eliminated.  Currently, these maneuver segments are executed in order to align the thrust vector 
with the orbit plane to achieve a pure semi-major axis adjustment.  This provides the maximum efficiency in 
maneuver performance, however when executing a maneuver of only a few seconds, the need to maximize the use 
of propellant diminishes greatly; the effect on inclination due to not including the yaw offset for a 2-second burn is 
minimal (you still get 97% of thrust in the desired direction) .  With
e needed for the entire execution of the maneuver.  This would lower the number of required contacts from 3 to 1 
and shorten the overall maneuver execution time to just one contact. 
 Lastly, because the instrument re-configuration is done via the MCL, which must be built the day before the 
maneuver, the FOT has begun to discuss with the IOTs how the instruments might be configured via real-time 
commanding.  Removing the dependence on the MCL would again shrink the response time as
reconfiguration could be commanded, in real-time, the contact before the execution of the DAM.  With all of these 
enhancements in place, the turn around time could go from 36-48 hours down to only a few hours.   
 These enhancements are still being analyzed by the FOT and put into place, however for other existing and 
future flight operations teams these are valuable lessons learned in how to execute a DAM.  There certainly exists a 
trade off between having precise timing and not being reliant on ground commanding when maximizing flexibility 
in being able to respond to a short turn around conjunction scenario.  Given the possibility
nd successful operation
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